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During the past year, relations among the NAFTA partners took on an increasingly two-
tier structure. More visible were a widening array of disagreements over issues including BMD,
Iraq, US demands on passports, the Senate’s vote to keep the border shut to Canadian cattle,
alleged American gun trafficking and, above all, Washington’s efforts to evade the NAFTA
ruling on softwood lumber. Yet, despite this mix of genuine grievances and political posturing,
we saw substantial movement toward a more efficient North American economic system.
Reports from the Security and Prosperity Partnership Working Groups set up after the Bush-Fox-
Martin meeting in Waco, Texas, illustrated a wide array of activities under the politico-
journalistic radar. Perhaps more important are the myriad of business- and community-driven
initiatives underway to expand and improve cross-border links. How much of all of this will
actually lead to concrete results is unclear. But several conclusions are evident. One is that this
movement is driven by deepening interdependence. The second is that the current two-tier
process in which national leaders kick each other in the shins while businesses and bureaucrats in
federal, state, and municipal governments and community groups squirrel away to repair
problems in the North American system will not work. Third is that “integration-by-stealth” is
also unacceptable. The time has come to examine carefully what is happening in North America,
to explore what our interests are in this emerging continental system, and to open a dialogue
about different, even competing, visions of North America. The dialogue should involve
perspectives from different regions, different economic and social sectors, and those who oppose
as well as support integration. The process must get outside of the beltways — it must give voice
to community and economic leaders who are most deeply involved in this new system.
1Other than the expression of anger at the Liberals, it is still too early to tease out the 
deeper implications of the January election in Canada. With regard to relations with the United 
States, we can reasonably anticipate some change in the government’s style, but given Harper’s 
minority position as well as the views of most Canadians on Iraq, Bush and an array of other 
matters, we should not expect dramatic change in substance. Even on issues (Kyoto, Ballistic 
Missile Defense [BMD]) where Harper’s views may be closer to Washington’s, the new Prime 
Minister has no political interest in reaching out to the current US administration.  If anything, 
Harper’s first exchange with Washington, over the arctic passage, suggests that he will seize the 
opportunity to stand on guard to protect Canada’s national interests.    
 
What we are likely to see, therefore, for the foreseeable future, is the continuation of the 
two-tier arrangement that developed over the past year.  
 
During 2005, the media, usually oblivious to North American developments, focused on 
increasing tension among the NAFTA partners. In March, after Ottawa’s decision not to join the 
BMD program, Time columnist Stephen Handelman wrote, “Canada’s stock seems be hovering 
at North Korea level in Washington.”  US demands on passports, the Senate’s vote to keep the 
border shut to Canadian cattle, alleged American gun trafficking, and, above all, Washington’s 
efforts to evade the NAFTA ruling on softwood lumber led to a Canadian tsunami of righteous 
indignation. While former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy urged Canadians to consider 
withdrawing from NAFTA, others suggested shutting down hydrocarbon exports until America 
shaped up on softwood. As the Canadian election campaign opened, it seemed that Prime 
Minister Martin was running against the United States – and that US Ambassador David Wilkins 
was deep in the fray.   
 
Yet, despite this mix of genuine grievances and political posturing, there was substantial 
movement toward a more efficient North American economic system. Reports from the Security 
and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) Working Groups set up after the Bush-Fox-Martin meeting in 
Waco, Texas, illustrated a wide array of activities taking place under the political-journalistic 
radar – some associated with existing NAFTA Working Groups, some apparently newer.1 These 
include, for example, a new framework agreement to encourage trans-border online business, the 
implementation of modifications of rules of origin covering many products, a memorandum of 
understanding on information exchange and cooperation on public health and safety protection of 
consumer products and even a harmonized approach to BSE. There were agreements to develop 
a trilateral Regulatory Cooperation Framework by 2007, to pursue a North American Steel 
Strategy, to create a trilateral Automotive Partnership Council of North America, and to 
undertake an accelerated program to promote mutual recognition of results from testing 
laboratories.  
 
Perhaps more important is the myriad of business and community driven initiatives 
underway to expand and improve cross-border links.  Specialist groups such as the Can-Am 
Border Trade Alliance provide a critical voice insisting that security and efficiency are not 
 
1 Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America; Report to Leaders (June 2005)
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incompatible. From the Detroit River International Crossing Project to the improved Lacolle-
Champlain Border Crossing and the East-West Maine Highway Study – to name a very few – 
business and local groups are pressing for new transportation and border infrastructure. The same 
goes for developments along trade corridors – such as deepening entrepreneurial ties among 
Winnipeg, Kansas City, Guadalajara, Monterrey, and Mexico’s deep-water Pacific ports. Indeed, 
Mexico plans to open its first foreign-based customs clearing facility in Kansas City in 2006, 
1000 miles from the border.  
 
How much of all of this will actually lead to concrete results is unclear. But three 
conclusions are evident. 
 
One conclusion is that this movement is driven by deepening interdependence. The 
political economy of North America is no longer composed of three national economies, but 
rather of links among production clusters and distribution hubs across the continent – links 
resting on new cross-border alignments among business, communities, and local and state-
provincial governments.  
 
The constantly repeated mantra that North America is the world’s largest trade bloc, with 
the world’s largest bilateral trade relationships, is misleading. The traditional trade paradigm, 
which encourages us to think of the exchange of finished goods across national borders, is 
simply not a productive way of imaging the substance of the North American economic system. 
We are not just trading partners. What flows across our borders are not mainly finished goods. 
We collaborate in complex, cross-border production systems. For example, a quarter of the more 
than a billion and a quarter dollars of goods crossing the US-Canada-Mexico borders daily is 
automotive. But we don’t sell cars to each other. That’s the key: We build them together. What is 
unsaid, however, is that the cumulative result of cross-border trade and investment is for most 
practical purposes an integrated economy.   
 
We also share increasingly integrated energy markets; service the same customers with 
an array of financial services; use the same roads and railroads to transport jointly made products 
to market; fly on the same integrated airline networks; and increasingly meet the same or similar 
standards of professional practice. This is what economists call “deep” or structural integration. 
 
This degree of collaboration between countries is unprecedented. But for the result—a 
new system with levels of integration that often surpass that of the European Union—there is no 
adequate social science vocabulary. Efforts to force this North American system into standard 
economic integration paradigms confuse more than they illuminate. Much work on Canada-US 
relations, for example, draws conclusions based on economic integration as trade theory 
understands it—that is, as led by trade liberalization and harmonization, moving progressively 
from free trade area to customs union, to a common market. But North America is already very 
much a single market without having passed through these subsequent stages.  
 
One vivid example of how North America works today is electricity. Joseph Dukert, an 
independent energy consultant, observes that “with scant attention from the public or the press, 
3North America has become the largest integrated energy market the world has ever seen.”2 This 
is not just one-way trade between Canadian and Mexican suppliers of energy and energy hungry 
US consumers. Several Canadian provinces are net importers of electricity from the US, while 
others are net exporters, and the US is now a consistent net exporter of gas to Mexico.  
 
The three countries of North America did not start out in the early 1990s to create 
trilateral energy interdependence, yet that is clearly what we have now. How did this all come 
about? A lot of push came from business and from changing perspectives on resource availability 
and markets. Deregulation and its impact on the structure of the industry and markets were vital 
elements in stimulating change, as was technology.  Organizational innovation was also 
important – the formation of The North American Energy Reliability Council and, of course, 
NAFTA.  
 
National electrical systems composed of vertically integrated companies no longer exist 
in North America. Deregulation and technology forced fundamental change in corporate, 
industry and market structures within a new continental framework.  
 
Agriculture is another example of the complex integration that characterizes large 
segments of the North American economy. One expert says “agriculture is one of North 
America's most integrated industries.” 3 In many sectors, products move back and forth across 
the border all along the value chain. In the cattle and beef sectors, for example, Mexico exports 
feeder calves to the U.S. market and before BSE, Canada exported fed steers. The United States 
ships feeders to Canada and breeding stock to Mexico and exports US beef to Mexico and 
Eastern Canada, while Canadian beef is exported to the western United States. 
 
Why do we still view North America in terms of a trade block? One reason is that 
resources have not been devoted to studying how things actually work. Neither firms doing 
business in North America nor research institutions have felt it was in their interest to encourage 
this kind of in-depth analysis of supply chains and logistics. Nor have governments: Viewing 
North America as relations among trading partners shelters perceptions of national sovereignty. 
Trade is less threatening than the reality of structural interdependence, of three nations sharing a 
single economic system.  
 
The second conclusion is that the current two-tier process in which national leaders kick 
each other in the shins while businesses and bureaucrats in federal, state, and municipal 
governments and community groups squirrel away to repair problems in the North American 
system is unacceptable – unacceptable because, the step by step approach (embodied in the SPP) 
lacks the coherence that is needed now not only to advance economic integration in North 
America, but even to maintain existing levels of integration. 
 
Building this new North American economic system was very much a bottom-up process, 
driven largely by corporate perceptions of changes in global and national markets and 
 
2 Joseph Dukert, “The Quiet Reality Of North American Energy Interdependence,” Study Group on Mapping the
New North American Reality, IRPP. The next paragraphs are drawn from this paper.
3 Parr Rossen, Director of the Center for North American Studies in the Department of Agricultural Economics at 
Texas A&M, Interview, December 17, 2004.
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environments. Trade liberalization in the GATT and the impact of the collapse of oil prices on 
Canada and Mexico made changes in the structure of business in North America both necessary 
and possible, but the process itself was the result of strategies put in place by many individual 
companies. The flexibility of this process, with little government control, encouraged rapid 
economic growth and job creation.  
 
From this perspective, NAFTA (and the earlier CUSFTA) can be viewed as responses by 
governments to developments already underway in the North American economy, efforts to 
bring regulatory frameworks into line with this emerging economic system and to encourage 
investors to continue to deepen these new arrangements.  
 
Flows of goods and capital across North America’s internal borders increased 
dramatically following NAFTA, the Mexican financial crisis of 1994 notwithstanding. More and 
more goods moved within companies, reflecting the deepening of corporate cross-border 
production, distribution, and supply systems.  
 
But even before 9/11, limits to bottom-up growth began to emerge. In some cases, the 
limits were political, as in the case of softwood lumber and in disagreements about the cross-
border movement of some agricultural goods. Other blockages were vices of virtues. The 
increase in volume of goods moving across our internal borders outran the capacity of North 
American physical infrastructure – roads, bridges, railroads, and border crossings. The impact of 
dysfunctional regulations – the “tyranny of small differences” – increased, too, as the scale of 
integration increased and as easier gains from bottom up integration had run their course.  
 
“Too many (sometimes purposeless) differences in regulation in the two economies,” 
George Haynel observes, “may create too much room for systemic friction within an integrated 
economic zone....”4
The bottom line here is that it can no longer be assumed that spill-over from economic 
integration will be automatic or efficient. 
 
Let us focus on just one example among many. Today, our transportation and border 
infrastructure barely suffice to support our economy; there is little margin left for future 
expansion.  
 
Substantial efforts have been made to improve the physical infrastructure at border 
crossings, particularly since 9/11. The US-Canada Smart Border agreement and the parallel 
agreement with Mexico marked significant commitments to improve border management. 
Organizations such as the Border Trade Alliance and the Can-Am Border Trade Alliance and 
various border communities have initiated dialogues with government agencies that have 
achieved significant incremental improvement in processes at the borders. Many who work in 
these agencies understand the problems of complexity and delay and seek better answers. But 
the pyramiding of requirements and programs, each of which can significantly inhibit quick 
border processing and all of which together require high degrees of inter-agency coordination 
 
4 George Haynal, “The Next Plateau In North America: What’s The Big Idea,” Study Group on Mapping the New
North American Reality, IRPP.
5(and typically involve federal, state, and even local governments), as well as new levels of 
cooperation with business and border communities has created tumult in some instances and 
threatens what Stephen Flynn calls “a potential train wreck.”5
While attention is at least focused on border issues, it is less certain that there is any sense 
of a North American transportation and logistics structure.  
 
People have talked about “NAFTA Superhighways” for a decade, and it has been clear 
since the mid-1980s that increased volumes of goods flowing north and south demand new 
approaches to transportation infrastructure.  
 
The US Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) in 1991 was aimed at 
alleviating bottlenecks along highways and at border crossings.  The Act identified 21 “high 
priority corridors,” and included funding for studies of border congestion as well as highway 
feasibility studies.  The National Highway System Designation Act of 1995 (NHS) added eight 
more high priority corridors. ISTEA evolved into the 1998 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st 
Century (TEA-21), which created an additional 14 high priority corridors.  This Act contained 
specific directives on trade corridor planning and border facility improvements.   
 
Entrepreneurial enthusiasm and the prospect of new funding encouraged the formation of 
various “trade corridor” organizations – typically groups of businesses and metropolitan and 
often state government agencies that would create an organization to capture some part of the 
new north-south flow.  
 
The highway funds became a pot into which Congressional etiquette encouraged 
everyone to dip his fingers. The number of designated high priority corridors increased quickly, 
and everyone sought to earmark funds for his/her own corridors. The result is that the latest map 
of high priority corridors looks like a plate of spaghetti. Highways and border crossings have 
been improved here and there, but no movement is visible toward developing a true North 
American highway system, and certainly nothing like the bruited about plans for super 
multimodal corridors, wired with fiber-optics and the latest digital frills, has come about. If 
anything, the general state of major highways in the US has declined over the past decade and it 
is hard to imagine that Mexico or even Canada have done better.6
Trucks carry some three-quarters of North America’s freight traffic, but the volume, if 
not the share, carried by rail has grown greatly. Mergers and alliances in the railroad industry in 
the mid-1990s seemed to be building networks that would provide seamless rail service from 
Canada to Mexico. From a security perspective, railroads are easier to monitor and control; it is 
much easier, once technology is in place, to get trains across borders. But no discussion has 
taken place on expanding the North American rail system, nor is there any sense of where, how,  
or with whom such discussions might begin. 
 
5 See Stephen Flynn, “The False Conundrum: Continental Integration Versus Homeland Security,” in Peter Andreas
and Thomas J. Biersteker, eds, The Rebordering of North America: Integration and Exclusion in a New Security
Contex” (New York & London: Routledge, 2003).
6 The “2003 Report Card” by the American Society of Civil Engineers, for example, awards a D- for maintaining
existing roads and bridges. (http://www.asce.org/reportcard/index.cfm?reaction=full&page=6#roads)
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Warning flags are up. Mary Brooks from Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, a 
specialist on road and rail transportation, warned the Study Group that “there is a danger of 
stalling the integration of the manufacturing sector if transport harmonization is further delayed. 
Rising security concerns post 9/11 have resulted in increased border delay, which has damaged 
the credibility of the just-in-time system. The result has been to boost buffer stocks, and force 
just-in-time supply chain managers to re-examine their sourcing options; it is of concern to 
Canada that many US companies will source domestically rather than within NAFTA due to 
border uncertainty.”7
Similarly, an automotive specialist, Isabel Studer, writes “The auto industry is widely 
seen as one of the most integrated North American industries. But the protectionist environment 
in the United States, the continued existence of costly rules of origin, expensive regulations, and 
different standards – particularly between Mexico and its two North American partners – are 
undermining the competitive potential derived from achieving further integration in the North 
American auto industry.”8
The SPP may mark a significant step forward in this situation. From one perspective at 
least, the SPP working group report suggests that elements within the three NAFTA governments 
do understand that the North American economic system is not simply a trade bloc but a deeply 
integrated economic system, and that governments must be more active in creating the conditions 
for further integration. Certainly agreements on a trilateral Regulatory Cooperation Framework 
and on sectoral strategies in steel, autos, and energy suggest a new view of North America. 
(Another perspective, of course, is that the report represents a great pile of things that are 
partially underway, that might be underway, or that possibly could be underway – all compiled 
to put as good a face as possible on the project.)   
 
Yet, even in the most optimistic reading, the SPP provides little sense of what we really 
want from all of this or how we can get there. In the each of the cases we have described, 
opportunities to resolve impediments to integration are best – indeed, perhaps only – found 
within a wider North American framework. It is difficult to seize these opportunities, however, 
because we lack a vision of what North America might become. The result is that efforts to 
resolve problems are fragmented and lack coherence. Where progress occurs, it is almost always 
piecemeal. The SPP does not change this situation; it offers no vision of why we are doing this or 
what we hope to accomplish.   
 
North American economic integration has been driven by corporate strategies and 
structures. Now, limits to this bottom up process have been reached and clear decisions are 
required on key issues of security, borders, transportation, energy, and immigration. At this 
point, the incremental approach is simply not enough.   
 
7 Mary Brooks, “Mapping the New North American Reality: The Road Sector,” Study Group on Mapping the New
North American Reality, IRPP.
8 Isabel Studer, “The North American auto industry,” Study Group on Mapping the New North American Reality,
IRPP.
7The third conclusion is that integration-by-stealth is also unacceptable. NAFTA became 
very quickly the lightning rod for all fears about globalization. If we hope to get beyond this, 
these concerns must be confronted. At the political level, there has been widespread failure to 
understand, let alone articulate and support, this new environment. Governments have lacked the 
appropriate conceptual tools and vocabulary to adequately address the new North America in 
policy terms. North American prosperity is intimately linked to the continent’s economic flows, 
but economic policy makers in the NAFTA countries continue to downplay this reality. Instead, 
they continue to act as though North America and NAFTA is the same thing: a three-way trade 
agreement among three sovereign countries. Politicians are reluctant to redefine national interests 
in North American terms, raising questions of our capacity to seize the opportunities offered in 
this new environment. NAFTA itself laid no foundations for identifying or solving problems that 
would emerge from deeper integration. It provided no vehicles for planning, or even thinking 
about what might come next. That’s why the SPP process seems to hang in mid-air. 
 
The danger is that without some overall sense of where we are going and why, the many 
steps now underway may not lead anywhere. 
 
The time has come to examine carefully what is happening in North America, to explore 
what our interests are in this emerging continental system, and to open a dialogue about 
different, even competing, visions of North America.  
 
We need to create a new, “North American” way of viewing policy options. We need a 
vision of North America that establishes objectives for deliberate actions to supplement the 
bottom-up process of North American integration, a vision that shapes discussions among the 
NAFTA nations, economic interests, and groups of civil society.  
 
The core of this vision would be the clearest understanding of the interests North 
Americans share in a freer continent-wide economic system and in an effective, cost-efficient, 
and secure infrastructure that supports this system.  
 
This vision would provide the context that the SPP process so clearly requires. It would 
focus attention on seeking ways to solve problems such as eliminating roadblocks and 
dismantling barriers to continuing integration, reaching out to groups that have not yet 
participated in the benefits of integration, sharing information, coordinating policy in key issue 
areas, and capturing new gains from deeper integration.  It would guide us in thinking about new 
institutions. Here, Robert Pastor has written most eloquently, for example, about a North 
American Court on Trade and Investment and a “North American Parliamentary Group” 
composed of members from the three national legislatures.9
Efforts to revitalize the movement toward economic integration in North America should 
not be perceived as the negotiation of a grand new bi- or tripartite trade deal zero-sum trade 
negotiation but as a collaborative effort to enunciate an accurate and compelling vision of the 
 
9 Robert Pastor, Toward a North American Community; Lessons from the Old World for the New (Washington. DC: 
Institute for International Economics, 2001:119-135). 
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North American economy, of the interests we share in this system and of steps that will make it 
safer, freer, more inclusive and more productive.    
 
Instead of compressing the wide range of distinct issues into a single negotiation, 
discussions should involve many participants – in think-tanks, universities, expert commissions, 
and groups of “wise people” and government agencies across the continent. It should involve 
perspectives from different regions, different economic and social sectors, and those who oppose 
as well as support integration. It should anticipate, given the regional architecture of North 
America and our federal systems of government, that proposed solutions might differ from 
region to region. 
 
We need desperately to stimulate research on this new North America. While some work 
has been done (for example, on a North American customs union), we need to promote much 
more investigation that probes more deeply into the evolving shape of the North American 
system. 
 
The process must get outside of the beltways – it must give voice to community and 
economic leaders who are most deeply involved in this new system. If efforts to build a new 
North American system imply the creation of a new Otto-Wash-Mexico City corridor, they will 
lack legitimacy in many parts of the continent. 
 
The process would serve another valuable purpose. It would accustom leaders and 
publics to think in terms of North American answers to critical economic and social issues, and 
to legitimize the notion that key issues that affect communities throughout the US can be 
resolved best by North American solutions. It is vital to identify key leadership constituencies 
that drive efforts to maintain open borders and to increase the efficient operation of the North 
American economy. The impetus for making the political decisions that are needed to build a 
more open, efficient, and representative North American system must come from constituencies 
that feel directly the impact of economic integration.  
 
Jean Monnet, the “father of the European Community,” felt that people could only unite 
behind a vision they shared. Monnet also understood the importance of building informed and 
committed constituencies, groups that would press governments to realize the vision. Through 
the Action Committee, Monnet sought to mobilize constituencies that would support a European 
Community. He describes the “constant outside pressure” that the Action Committee brought to 
bear, and “the moral influence the Committee exerted on the established authorities in each 
country.”10 
In North America, constituencies already exist. They consist of companies that run 
continental production, supply, and marketing systems; cities where jobs depend upon efficient 
North American transportation and logistics networks; and communities living on the borders. 
Most of their leaders understand how these systems and networks operate.  
 
The task is to mobilize these groups to educate their representatives in state and national 
capitals about the impact of North American economic integration on jobs and economic 
 
10 Jean Monnet, Memoires (1978: 408).  
9development in their own communities. To apply the “constant outside pressure” and “moral 
influence” Monnet described—to create a true voice for North American integration in our 
governments. To create a voice in our governments that enunciates the goals of North America 
integration and inclusion and presses for new policies to achieve these objectives. 
 
There is a North American reality – a complex North American system, many sectors of 
which are characterized by deep structural integration – that is deeply misunderstood. Canadians, 
Mexicans, and Americans, too, depend profoundly on this system. After a decade of rapid 
growth, however, and in the wake of the events of 9/11, we see evidence that integration has 
slowed and that the North American economic system is becoming more fragile. To reinvigorate 
the process of integration requires the mobilization of informed and active constituencies that 
will press the three NAFTA governments to take new, constructive steps forward.   
 
